The purpose of this paper is to
consider features of small island states in the Asia-Pacific region and to
document some of the key characteristics that
set them apart from small states in other regions. The paper restricts itself to a limited number of general indicators which are largely macro-orientated. In particular, it considers population size, income per capita, the fertility of land, and ability to tap into economies of scale. It also makes an attempt to capture the degree of geographic isolation confronted by some countries. As a result, we leave aside equally important but more micro-orientated variables (such as telecommunications or electricity generation) as well as development indicators (such as literacy or infant mortality rates). We show that small island states in the Pacific are typically different from countries in other regional groupings in that they are extremely geographically isolated and have limited scope to tap into economies of scale due to small populations. The degree of smallness can complicate the interpretation of income per capita, and the lack of fertile land constrains the opportunities to diversify food sources away from imports for some countries. The cursory empirical evidence presented appears consistent with our prior that most of these factors are important determinants of economic outcomes in small states.
set them apart from small states in other regions. The paper restricts itself to a limited number of general indicators which are largely macro-orientated. In particular, it considers population size, income per capita, the fertility of land, and ability to tap into economies of scale. It also makes an attempt to capture the degree of geographic isolation confronted by some countries. As a result, we leave aside equally important but more micro-orientated variables (such as telecommunications or electricity generation) as well as development indicators (such as literacy or infant mortality rates). We show that small island states in the Pacific are typically different from countries in other regional groupings in that they are extremely geographically isolated and have limited scope to tap into economies of scale due to small populations. The degree of smallness can complicate the interpretation of income per capita, and the lack of fertile land constrains the opportunities to diversify food sources away from imports for some countries. The cursory empirical evidence presented appears consistent with our prior that most of these factors are important determinants of economic outcomes in small states.
Small states in other parts of
the world have their own characteristics that lead to somewhat different set of
factors that might be associated with vulnerability to shocks. These may or may
not have been taken into consideration in the work presented below, which
employs a far less than exhaustive set of potential indicators. So while the
scope of this paper is purposely limited to the countries of principal interest
for this study, it may provide a basis for more comprehensive future research.
The remainder of the paper is
organized in the following manner. Sections II to VI discuss a number of key
macro-related variables in the context of small states. These cover the
definition of small states in terms of population size, constraints in the ability
to take advantage of economies of scale, income per capita as a measure of
poverty, the relationship between land fertility and import replacement through
agriculture, and perhaps most importantly, the degree of geographic isolation.
Section VII summarizes these indicators by means of a simple and transparent
ranking. This section also makes an attempt to relate the ranking to actual
economic outcomes. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section
VIII.
II. DEFINING SMALL STATES BY POPULATION
There is no universally accepted
definition of what makes a country small. Relevant metrics include population,
size of the land or territory (including maritime zones), and Gross National
Income (GNI).[2]
However, since population is usually correlated with other variables like GNI
in most countries, the number of residents is often used as the measure that
defines smallness. The World Bank defines a small state as one with a
population of less than 1½ million people (World Bank, 2007), but also notes that
no definition, whether it be population, geographic size, or income, is likely
to be fully satisfactory. In practice, any threshold used has an arbitrary
element and larger states that lie outside this definition will share some of
the characteristics or vulnerabilities of smaller countries.
Using World Bank data, we are
able to derive a consistent data set for a preliminary analysis of a sample of
50 small states (refer also to Appendix I).[3]
The smallest of these is Tuvalu in the Asia-Pacific region with a population of
only around 10,000 people. The largest is Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean
with around 1.3 million people. In Figure 1 these 50 countries are ranked by
population. Those in the Asia-Pacific region, which are the subject of this
paper, are highlighted in a darker color.
Of the 10 smallest states
listed, four are in Europe and Central Asia, three are small island states in
the Pacific (Tuvalu, Palau, Marshall Islands), two are in Latin America and the
Caribbean, while Greenland represents an outlier not easily classified to any
region. The difficulty of defining aspects of smallness is usefully illustrated
by examining these extremely small countries (sometimes referred to as
microstates). While the number of people residing in each country is
indisputably small, they can be quite heterogeneous in terms of other economic
indicators that make differentiation between small states important. For
example, while the population of Monaco is around three times larger than that
of Tuvalu, GNI per capita is almost 40 times larger. Indeed, of the 10 smallest
countries in this sample, only Dominica is considered to be eligible under the
income criteria for both concessional borrowing from the International
Development Association (IDA) and also currently qualifies for the International
Monetary Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT).[4]
Extremely small populations are therefore not always systematically related to
income, but in some cases raise a number of other relevant idiosyncratic
considerations.
III. LACKING ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Generally speaking, the
relationship between population and total income appears to be positive. This
is not surprising given that labor is a major input into the production process
and a larger workforce can produce a greater number of goods and services, for
higher total income. Figure 2 shows this relationship for the small state
sample and plots a simple trend line, which admittedly has only weak
explanatory power. The Asia-Pacific region is again highlighted by a darker
color.
Since population is only one of
many factors that determine income, the distribution of countries around the
trend is relatively wide. Indeed, there appears to be a tendency to deviate
further as population increases. Several outliers to the relationship are
notable, with Luxembourg generating the largest GNI despite a relatively small
population.[5]
There is a confluence of attributes that makes some countries able to overcome
the barriers of having a small resident workforce. In the case of Luxembourg,
specialization in the provision of high value added financial services is
possible due to a number of unique features, including very close proximity to
highly skilled labor markets and infrastructure in neighboring countries,
notably Germany and France. A significant share of the people employed in
Luxembourg does not reside in the country itself, but instead commute daily
from neighboring towns across the national border. Similarly, centers for trade
and commerce like Macau are able to generate higher income than countries of
similar size with less of this type of economic activity. The key feature of
such trade hubs tends to be strategic location on major trade and shipping
routes which act as gateways to major markets.
The small island states in the
Pacific tend to lack the attributes enjoyed by financial centers and trade
hubs. They are typically considerable distances away from the major labor
markets that are better equipped to supply a more skilled workforce, like
Australia and New Zealand (see also Section VI on Geographic Isolation).
Geography also precludes sharing of infrastructure with more developed
neighbors. Indeed, basic infrastructure may need to be duplicated if
populations are dispersed, as they are in countries comprising groups of islands.
Furthermore, they are usually not en route of the major shipping lanes which
connect major producers with markets and are therefore unlikely candidates for
establishing trade hubs. Nonetheless, there are certain types of financial
services which are less closely linked to geographic location, such as business
registrations or incorporations and registration of international cargo ships,
which small Pacific islands are not precluded from pursuing.
A. Fixed costs spread over narrow base
One implication of small
population is that total income, and therefore the tax base, might be so small
that the fixed costs associated with the provision of public goods and services
have to be spread across a very narrow base. As a result, fixed costs may
represent an unusually high share of national income. One consequence might be
that there is insufficient tax revenue to secure the public provision of basic
health services, transportation, or government administration. These
constraints often result in small administrations that lack the capacity to
function efficiently. The degree to which this is an issue varies between
countries.
This is an argument related to
economies of scale in that the provision of public goods and services might not
be possible at the quantity necessary to minimize the average cost, and thereby
gives rise to inefficient outcomes that are most difficult to overcome in
extremely small countries. Another relevant consideration might be the expense
incurred in building infrastructure resilient to frequent natural disasters and
adverse weather conditions.
Table 1: Percentage Deviation from Small State Median Income
Median GNI of
small state sample was US$1,719 million, 2010. Countries ordered by population
as in Figure 1.
Country Per cent below Per cent Above
Tuvalu
|
-97.3
|
|
Palau
|
-92.2
|
|
Gibraltar
|
-43.6
|
|
San
Marino
|
-8.5
|
|
Monaco
|
276.9
|
|
Liechtenstein
|
185.3
|
|
St. Kitts
and Nevis
|
-64.2
|
|
Marshall
Islands
|
-88.6
|
|
Greenland
|
-14.7
|
|
Dominica
|
-73.3
|
|
Isle of
Man
|
131.1
|
|
Andorra
|
100.6
|
|
Seychelles
|
-50.8
|
|
Antigua
and Barbuda
|
-32.0
|
|
Kiribati
|
-88.4
|
|
Tonga
|
-80.1
|
|
Grenada
|
-57.9
|
|
St.
Vincent and the Grenadines
|
-60.0
|
|
Micronesia,
Fed. Sts.
|
-82.3
|
|
Channel
Islands
|
495.8
|
|
Sao Tome
and Principe
|
-88.4
|
|
St.
Lucia
|
-33.6
|
|
Samoa
|
-68.1
|
|
Vanuatu
|
-63.1
|
|
Barbados
|
100.9
|
|
Maldives
|
5.8
|
|
Iceland
|
503.9
|
|
Bahamas,
The
|
305.7
|
|
Belize
|
-23.6
|
|
Brunei
Darussalam
|
624.9
|
|
Malta
|
363.0
|
|
Cape
Verde
|
-5.8
|
|
Luxembourg
|
2,170.6
|
|
Suriname
|
79.0
|
|
Solomon
Islands
|
-67.9
|
|
Macao SAR,
China
|
977.9
|
|
Montenegro
|
147.8
|
|
Equatorial
Guinea
|
492.3
|
|
Bhutan
|
-20.8
|
|
Comoros
|
-68.0
|
|
Guyana
|
25.9
|
|
Fiji
|
81.7
|
|
Djibouti
|
-35.7
|
|
Cyprus
|
1,276.2
|
|
Timor-Leste
|
45.0
|
|
Swaziland
|
81.5
|
|
Bahrain
|
1,046.9
|
|
Mauritius
|
477.4
|
|
Estonia
|
1,026.9
|
|
Trinidad
and Tobago
|
1,099.9
|
|
Sources:
World Bank, author's calculations
One simple way to make an
assessment about the opportunity available to reap economies of scale is to
calculate the percentage deviation of each country’s GNI from the median of the
small state sample.[6]
It allows calibration of which states are the smallest and therefore the most
likely to be lacking in the ability to exhaust economies of scale. The
calculations are shown in Table 1. While very small states like Tuvalu and
Palau are more than 90 percent smaller than the sample median, others are
considerably better placed. It is notable that of the small countries in the
Pacific, almost all are so small that scope to access economies of scale could
be a significant issue. Only Timor-Leste, Macau, and Fiji were larger than the
median income of US$1.7 billion in 2010.
B. Scope for regional cooperation
Notwithstanding the
country-specific constraints on accessing economies of scale, there may however
be scope to improve the position of small states through regional cooperation
(see also Hausmann, 2001). A number of small states could come together to form
a larger common market for goods and service, or share access to certain types
of infrastructure. Figure 3 sums the population of all countries in each region
to derive a regional aggregate as an indication of the potential for
cooperation.
In terms of the scope for
cooperation in building scale based on the aggregate number of people in each
region, Pacific islands do not appear to be at a disadvantage relative to other
regions. Instead, it would seem that small states in South Asia, as well as the
Middle East and North Africa are the most limited in tapping into the benefits
from cooperation – assuming that they are also somehow unable to cooperate with
larger neighbors.[7]
Greenland may be of less concern due to its special relationship with Denmark.
Nonetheless, there may be many
other barriers that represent obstacles to effective cooperation. Some of these
might be cultural, language, distance between countries, legal structure,
political, and other forms of heterogeneity among neighboring states, which
will differ according to region. On the other hand, there are a number of
regional forums that facilitate policy coordination and discussion. This has
certainly been the case for some time in the Pacific.[8]
IV. INCOME PER CAPITA
Income per capita is an
important variable, not least because it is often used as a proxy indicator for
poverty and aid eligibility. For example, IDA eligibility is principally
determined on a threshold related to GNI per capita which is reviewed
periodically.[9]
Eligibility for the IMF’s PRGT takes its cue from IDA and is therefore
similarly based on income per capita.
However, as with the separate
consideration of total income and population in relation to the possible
inability of very small states to access economies of scale, income per capita
might also suffer from being an imperfect indicator. Take for example an
extremely small state. It might generate sufficient income from the sale of fishing
licenses and remittances to rank relatively highly in terms of income per
capita because the total income numerator is shared across a very small
population denominator. Nonetheless, it might find itself in a situation where
total income is so small that it proves prohibitively expensive for the
government to provide adequate health services domestically. If a substantial
part of that higher income per capita therefore has to be allocated toward
expensive medical services in another country, the remaining disposable per
capita amount available to households for consumption and saving might be
significantly lower. In this simple example it is easy to recognize that
assessments based on income per capita alone can be misleading.[10]
This problem becomes more pronounced as the denominator in the calculation
takes an extremely small value.
Figure 4 plots the per capita
income for the sample of small states. One consideration is that while this
sample is restricted to small states, there are many countries with populations
that exceed the 1½ million threshold but have per capita income much smaller
than several of the countries depicted. This is typically attributable to a
very small numerator relative to a very large denominator in the calculation.
It therefore becomes important to understand the determinants of income per
capita when making policy decisions.
The top decile of five small
states with the highest GNI per capita is entirely comprised of European
countries (Monaco, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Channel Islands, San Marino). The
proximity to neighboring countries, access to their workforce, infrastructure,
and the nearest continent may well be important explanatory factors in the
scope to overcome disadvantages associated with being small (Martins and
Winters, 2004). It also raises the need for consideration of multiple
vulnerabilities for some small states. While it might be feasible to routinely
overcome one or even two types of exposure, once countries are disadvantaged by
several such factors, it becomes less likely that they can overcome all of them
all the time and escape the adverse consequences of their vulnerabilities.
V. SCOPE FOR IMPORT SUBSTITUTION THROUGH AGRICULTURE
Another common feature of small
states is that despite sometimes very large overall land masses, they typically
have very little fertile or arable land available for cultivation.[11]
One reason why this might be considered to be an important macro-related indicator
for countries is because it could be related to the ability to substitute for
imports of foodstuffs. Countries may well be more exposed to balance of
payments crises if they have a heavy dependence on imports of food as a result
of inadequate conditions to foster domestic agriculture. The most striking
example of this is Greenland, where an extremely large landmass is very
sparsely populated (see Table 2). The vulnerabilities resulting from excessive
dependence on imports of foodstuffs was sharply underscored in recent years
when food prices rose sharply (Colmer and Wood, 2012; Sheridan et al, 2012).
In terms of the square meters
per capita available for cultivation, some countries are in a considerably
worse position than others. Five states in the sample have no arable land at
all (Macao, Greenland, Monaco, Gibraltar, Tuvalu). Several Pacific islands
suffer from very infertile soil, or in some cases, no soil at all. Many consist
of nothing more than coral or sand and Tuvalu stands out as being particularly
infertile and unsuitable for agriculture. On the other hand, some of the larger
Pacific islands like Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, and Timor-Leste are relatively
fertile, especially when compared to some states in Africa. On average, the
states in the Pacific may not be as infertile as desert countries in the Middle
East and North Africa or Greenland, but they are notably more infertile than
small countries in Europe or Latin America and the Caribbean (Figure 5).
Table 2: Scope for Agriculture
As
at 2009. Countries ordered by population as in Figure 1.
Country
|
Total land
mass
|
Non-Arable
Land
|
Arable
Land
|
Arable Land
|
|||
km2
|
km2
|
km2
|
m2
per capita
|
||||
Tuvalu
|
30
|
30
|
0
|
0
|
|||
Palau
|
460
|
450
|
10
|
488
|
|||
Gibraltar
|
10
|
10
|
0
|
0
|
|||
San
Marino
|
60
|
50
|
10
|
317
|
|||
Monaco
|
2
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
|||
Liechtenstein
|
160
|
130
|
30
|
833
|
|||
St. Kitts
and Nevis
|
260
|
220
|
40
|
763
|
|||
Marshall
Islands
|
180
|
160
|
20
|
370
|
|||
Greenland
|
410,450
|
410,450
|
0
|
0
|
|||
Dominica
|
750
|
690
|
60
|
886
|
|||
Isle of
Man
|
570
|
520
|
50
|
603
|
|||
Andorra
|
470
|
460
|
10
|
118
|
|||
Seychelles
|
460
|
450
|
10
|
116
|
|||
Antigua
and Barbuda
|
440
|
360
|
80
|
902
|
|||
Kiribati
|
810
|
790
|
20
|
201
|
|||
Tonga
|
720
|
560
|
160
|
1,538
|
|||
Grenada
|
340
|
320
|
20
|
191
|
|||
St.
Vincent and the Grenadines
|
390
|
340
|
50
|
457
|
|||
Micronesia,
Fed. Sts.
|
700
|
680
|
20
|
180
|
|||
Channel
Islands
|
190
|
150
|
40
|
261
|
|||
Sao Tome
and Principe
|
960
|
860
|
100
|
605
|
|||
St.
Lucia
|
610
|
580
|
30
|
172
|
|||
Samoa
|
2,830
|
2,580
|
250
|
1,366
|
|||
Vanuatu
|
12,190
|
11,990
|
200
|
835
|
|||
Barbados
|
430
|
270
|
160
|
585
|
|||
Maldives
|
300
|
260
|
40
|
127
|
|||
Iceland
|
100,250
|
100,180
|
70
|
221
|
|||
Bahamas,
The
|
10,010
|
9,930
|
80
|
233
|
|||
Belize
|
22,810
|
22,110
|
700
|
2,031
|
|||
Brunei
Darussalam
|
5,270
|
5,240
|
30
|
75
|
|||
Malta
|
320
|
240
|
80
|
194
|
|||
Cape
Verde
|
4,030
|
3,430
|
600
|
1,210
|
|||
Luxembourg
|
2,590
|
1,970
|
620
|
1,226
|
|||
Suriname
|
156,000
|
155,420
|
580
|
1,106
|
|||
Solomon
Islands
|
27,990
|
27,830
|
160
|
297
|
|||
Macao SAR,
China
|
28
|
28
|
0
|
0
|
|||
Montenegro
|
13,450
|
11,720
|
1,730
|
2,740
|
|||
Equatorial
Guinea
|
28,050
|
26,730
|
1,320
|
1,885
|
|||
Bhutan
|
38,390
|
37,640
|
750
|
1,033
|
|||
Comoros
|
1,860
|
1,060
|
800
|
1,089
|
|||
Guyana
|
196,850
|
192,650
|
4,200
|
5,567
|
|||
Fiji
|
18,270
|
16,670
|
1,600
|
1,859
|
|||
Djibouti
|
23,180
|
23,160
|
20
|
23
|
|||
Cyprus
|
9,240
|
8,370
|
870
|
788
|
|||
Timor-Leste
|
14,870
|
13,220
|
1,650
|
1,468
|
|||
Swaziland
|
17,200
|
15,450
|
1,750
|
1,475
|
|||
Bahrain
|
760
|
750
|
10
|
8
|
|||
Mauritius
|
2,030
|
1,160
|
870
|
679
|
|||
Estonia
|
42,390
|
36,430
|
5,960
|
4,449
|
|||
Trinidad
and Tobago
|
5,130
|
4,880
|
250
|
186
|
|||
Source: World
Bank
The regional findings described
above are not particularly surprising given the geographic location of states
in the sample. European countries stand out as having the most arable land and
with the few significant exceptions of India and Nigeria the rest of the world
has less agriculturally productive land (Figure 6).[12]
There are of course several smaller exceptions to this.
Figure 6: Arable Land
Trade with highly
agriculturally productive countries is one possible way to overcome the
domestic constraints that some small states face. Some of the important factors
in determining that possibility are access to alternative resource endowments
that can be traded and the proximity to such trading partners. While Pacific
island states might be able to trade fish stocks, or use the revenue from
selling fishing rights, they remain disadvantaged by their relative geographic
isolation which raises transport costs and can even prove prohibitive to
gaining market access (see below).
VI. GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION
The most distinguishing
characteristic of small Pacific islands is how remote they are, not only from
the nearest continent, but also from neighboring countries. While technological
progress has allowed countries to overcome barriers such as those related to
effective communication, distance remains a key challenge to overcome when
physical factors are important. The transport costs associated with trade and commerce
are therefore commensurately higher as distance increases (Commonwealth
Secretariat and World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States, 2000; and Zhu,
2012).[13]
This problem is compounded by import dependence, especially for foodstuffs due
to non-arable land, discussed earlier. In Martins and Winters (2004), it is
shown that small economies might not even be suitable locations for tourism
unless they have specific comparative advantages that allow them to charge
substantially higher prices to overcome cost disadvantages. Furthermore, since
this geographic isolation is closely associated with dispersion of many small
islands in the Pacific Ocean, there is also a link to the susceptibility of
these states to natural disasters such as tsunamis and hurricanes. The
environmental challenges also extend to issues associated with rising sea
levels and global warming, although some of these issues are held in common
with other regions, especially the Caribbean where small states are vulnerable
to similar environmental pressures. Appendix I lists some relevant indicators
such as the isolation sub index (EVI-13) of the Environmental Vulnerability
Index calculated by SOPAC and the UNEP.
In the sample of small states,
Samoa, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Tonga are some of the most
isolated states in the world (Figure 7). Each is more than 3,000 kilometers
from the nearest continent, Australia.
The vulnerability represented by
their geographic isolation therefore notably differentiates small islands in
the Pacific from many of the other small states in the sample. The average
distance to the nearest continent for Pacific islands is more than four to five
times that applicable to the average country in the Caribbean or Sub-Saharan
Africa (Figure 8). On the other hand, small states in Europe or Northern Africa
and the Middle East are considerably less isolated on the measure used here.[14]
When considering the issue of
isolation, additional factors that are somewhat beyond the scope of this paper
are worth alluding to briefly. In Mayer and Zignago (2011) the authors
calculate a more comprehensive measure of remoteness by including not just the
single distance between a country and the nearest continent, but by measuring
the distance between each country and all other countries in their sample of
224 countries. This metric lends further support to the finding that small
Pacific island states are particularly isolated. The main driving factor is
that these states are not only far away from the nearest continent but are
widely dispersed over a vast area of ocean and therefore also very far away
from each other and all other countries.[15]
An interesting further augmentation of the data is to weight these distances by
GDP to capture how physically far removed countries are from major world
markets (Chen et al, 2012). Once again, this augmentation makes small states in
the Pacific even worse off. Even though Australia has a very large land mass
(it is the sixth largest country in the world), it has a relatively small
population and therefore also represents a much smaller market than the large
neighbors (such as China, the euro area, or the United States) to some small
states. This consideration of distance from major markets is also relevant to
some countries in Africa even though the state might be on the actual continent,
and could change some of the results shown above.
VII. VULNERABILITY RANKING
A simple way of summarizing this
type of information is to rank states according to how they are positioned
relative to other small states on the factors discussed in this paper. The aim
is to keep the summary indicator as simple and transparent as possible. From
the outset we note the tradeoffs involved. Mechanical indices can never fully
reflect the complexities and changing dynamics involved in the interaction
between these variables. Additionally, there are limitations that arise from
the inputs into the calculations being far from exhaustive in their description
of small states. Nevertheless, we hope to convey some of the key
characteristics that set small Pacific islands apart from small states in other
regions.
A. Ranking small states
We use each variable discussed
in the paper and calculate how every small state ranks relative to all others.
For example, if we rank the sample of 50 states according to population size,
one might consider the smallest state as being the most vulnerable. The country
with the smallest population, Tuvalu, is given an index ranking of 50 and the
country with the largest population, Trinidad and Tobago, is given an index
ranking of one. Larger numbers therefore indicate greater relative
vulnerability on the indicator in question.[16]
Similarly, countries with the least amount of arable land per capita might be
vulnerable, as would be the countries that are the furthest away from the
nearest continent and most isolated. Countries with the smallest absolute US
dollar level of GNI are probably less able to reap economies of scale in the
provision of public goods and services and could be disadvantaged. Similarly,
those with the lowest income per capita might typically be considered to be
relatively poor and therefore exposed to adverse shocks that cannot be easily
absorbed without assistance from the international community.
We try to capture vulnerability
by synthesizing the measures discussed above into an index. An aggregate
summary ranking is achieved by calculating the equally weighted average across
the five individual indicator rankings used in this simple study.[17]
The result is a broad
reflection of which states in
the sample are the most vulnerable. Table 3 provides the details of the
calculations and ranking.
Table 3:
Ranking by Indicator
Population
|
Arable
land
|
Distance
|
GNI
|
GNI/Capita
|
Average
|
|
Vulnerability
|
Vulnerability
|
Vulnerability
|
Vulnerability
|
Vulnerability
|
Vulnerability
|
|
Rank
(1-50)
|
Rank
(1-50)
|
Rank
(1-50)
|
Rank
(1-50)
|
Rank
(1-50)
|
Rank
average
|
|
Tuvalu
|
50
|
50
|
48
|
50
|
33
|
46.2
|
Kiribati
|
36
|
34
|
47
|
46
|
45
|
41.6
|
Marshall Islands
|
43
|
28
|
49
|
48
|
35
|
40.6
|
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
|
32
|
38
|
44
|
45
|
41
|
40.0
|
Palau
|
49
|
26
|
39
|
49
|
29
|
38.4
|
Solomon Islands
|
16
|
30
|
41
|
40
|
49
|
35.2
|
Sao Tome and Principe
|
30
|
23
|
24
|
47
|
48
|
34.4
|
Tonga
|
35
|
7
|
46
|
44
|
37
|
33.8
|
Samoa
|
28
|
10
|
50
|
42
|
39
|
33.8
|
St. Kitts and Nevis
|
44
|
21
|
42
|
39
|
22
|
33.6
|
Seychelles
|
38
|
42
|
29
|
35
|
23
|
33.4
|
Greenland
|
42
|
47
|
35
|
28
|
13
|
33.0
|
Vanuatu
|
27
|
18
|
40
|
38
|
42
|
33.0
|
St. Lucia
|
29
|
39
|
34
|
32
|
28
|
32.4
|
Dominica
|
41
|
17
|
33
|
43
|
26
|
32.0
|
Gibraltar
|
48
|
49
|
15
|
34
|
9
|
31.0
|
St. Vincent & the Grenadines
|
33
|
27
|
27
|
37
|
30
|
30.8
|
Grenada
|
34
|
36
|
22
|
36
|
25
|
30.6
|
Maldives
|
25
|
40
|
30
|
25
|
32
|
30.4
|
Antigua and Barbuda
|
37
|
16
|
43
|
31
|
20
|
29.4
|
Djibouti
|
8
|
44
|
13
|
33
|
47
|
29.0
|
Comoros
|
11
|
14
|
26
|
41
|
50
|
28.4
|
Cape Verde
|
19
|
12
|
31
|
26
|
38
|
25.2
|
Monaco
|
46
|
48
|
14
|
14
|
1
|
24.6
|
San Marino
|
47
|
29
|
11
|
27
|
5
|
23.8
|
Andorra
|
39
|
41
|
12
|
19
|
7
|
23.6
|
Brunei Darussalam
|
21
|
43
|
36
|
7
|
11
|
23.6
|
Barbados
|
26
|
25
|
28
|
18
|
21
|
23.6
|
Fiji
|
9
|
6
|
45
|
20
|
36
|
23.2
|
Timor-Leste
|
6
|
9
|
32
|
23
|
44
|
22.8
|
Iceland
|
24
|
33
|
37
|
8
|
10
|
22.4
|
Bhutan
|
12
|
15
|
9
|
29
|
46
|
22.2
|
Malta
|
20
|
35
|
25
|
12
|
15
|
21.4
|
Isle of Man
|
40
|
24
|
19
|
17
|
6
|
21.2
|
Bahamas, The
|
23
|
32
|
23
|
13
|
14
|
21.0
|
Mauritius
|
3
|
22
|
38
|
11
|
24
|
19.6
|
Channel Islands
|
31
|
31
|
20
|
9
|
4
|
19.0
|
Belize
|
22
|
4
|
4
|
30
|
34
|
18.8
|
Liechtenstein
|
45
|
19
|
10
|
15
|
2
|
18.2
|
Macao SAR, China
|
15
|
46
|
16
|
6
|
8
|
18.2
|
Suriname
|
17
|
13
|
8
|
22
|
31
|
18.2
|
Bahrain
|
4
|
45
|
17
|
4
|
16
|
17.2
|
Swaziland
|
5
|
8
|
6
|
21
|
43
|
16.6
|
Trinidad and Tobago
|
1
|
37
|
18
|
3
|
17
|
15.2
|
Guyana
|
10
|
1
|
1
|
24
|
40
|
15.2
|
Montenegro
|
14
|
3
|
3
|
16
|
27
|
12.6
|
Cyprus
|
7
|
20
|
21
|
2
|
12
|
12.4
|
Equatorial Guinea
|
13
|
5
|
5
|
10
|
18
|
10.2
|
Luxembourg
|
18
|
11
|
7
|
1
|
3
|
8.0
|
Estonia 2 2 2 5 19
6.0
Source:
Author’s calculations
According to this metric, Tuvalu
is the most vulnerable small state in the sample. It has a very small
population, no arable land, it is very isolated, and has little scope for
accessing economies of scale in the provision of public goods and services on account
of its small GNI. These are all factors that more than offset its more
favorable ranking in terms of income per capita.
At the other extreme is Estonia.
In the small states context, it has a relatively large population, land is very
fertile, it is surrounded by many close neighbors on the European continent,
and total gross national income is relatively high. These factors more than
offset a relatively low ratio of income per capita. This outcome is not
intended to imply that Estonia, or other countries in the sample, do not face
other substantial vulnerabilities. Instead, it is simply a reflection of how
states compare based on just the five indicators chosen to illustrate the
relative position of small states in the Pacific.
Broadly speaking, we can reach
some tentative conclusions about average regional characteristics of small
states (Figure 9).
Small States in the Pacific are
the most vulnerable on a number of counts considered in this paper. This is in
part driven by several common vulnerabilities such as isolation, but also by
the extreme exposure of some states in the region on several additional
indicators of vulnerability. They are particularly isolated, and lack the
ability to reap economies of scale. They also generally have low income
per capita, small populations, and little arable land. Compared with other
regions, they rank worse than the average of 25.5 on all measures considered. [18]
Small states in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan
Africa are probably somewhat less vulnerable to the factors considered here.
These regions appear to have a common degree of overall exposure. Small
countries in Europe would appear to be the least disadvantaged in this sample –
a result in large part driven by a number of outliers that are highly developed
and rich countries that happen to have small populations but do not appear particularly
disadvantaged by this characteristic. It is therefore worth keeping in mind
that other small European countries are less fortunate, and that for the
Caribbean, South Asia, and Africa we might be doing a poor job of capturing
other forms of vulnerability.
B. Empirical link to real economic outcomes
In order to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the relationship between the potential
vulnerability indicators for small states and real economic outcomes, we fit a
series of simple linear regressions. The growth rate in GNI is therefore the
dependent variable we are trying to explain using indicators of
vulnerability.
Economic outcomes are proxied
by annualized nominal growth in GNI measured in US dollar terms between 2001
and 2010. The data are annual and therefore only nine observations are
available for most countries. Three countries (Montenegro,
Sao Tome and Principe,
Timor-Leste) have fewer observations than this and Gibraltar had to be dropped
from the sample of 50 countries due to lack of time series data. We also note
the high likelihood of cross-correlation between growth outcomes during the
recent financial crisis, given that it represents a common shock to all
countries in the sample, albeit with different intensities.
To investigate the usefulness
of ranking countries by their degree of vulnerability, we fit separate
regressions using each of the five vulnerability indicators shown in Table 3
(population, land, distance, income, income/capita).[19]
Since states are ranked according to their relative degree of vulnerability in
each of these indicators, we attempt to capture the relationship between growth
and vulnerability. Our prior is to find a negative relationship between the
relative degree of vulnerability exhibited by a state and the average growth
rate it is able to achieve. For example, we would expect that a high ranking on
distance – which by construction indicates that the state is relatively
isolated – would result in lower growth outcomes than for states that are less
isolated.
A closer look at the
regressions (Table 4) indicates that the slope coefficient for almost all
individual indicators is consistent with the expected negative relationship
between relative vulnerability and growth. A notable exception is income per
capita, which indicates a weak positive relationship with growth. Possible
explanations for why lower income per capita might be associated with faster
growth could relate to structural factors such as developing countries
typically being able to grow more rapidly than more developed countries (which
would also tend to have higher income per capita). More realistically, the relationship
between income per capita and growth is probably not a very meaningful
indicator – especially in the case of microstates – and this is reflected in a
statistically insignificant relationship as indicated by the P-value on the
variable.20
Table 4:
Relationship between Vulnerability Ranking and Growth
Ranking
according to the ith Slope RMSE(ith)/
indicator of
vulnerability # coefficient
P-value
RMSE(ith)
RMSE(index)
population
|
-0.19
|
0.0006
|
**
|
5.15
|
1.0158
|
|||||||||
land
|
-0.16
|
0.0063
|
**
|
5.40
|
1.0651
|
|||||||||
distance
|
-0.18
|
0.0015
|
**
|
5.25
|
1.0355
|
|||||||||
income
|
-0.14
|
0.0167
|
*
|
5.50
|
1.0848
|
|||||||||
income/capita
|
0.02
|
0.6899
|
5.84
|
1.1519
|
||||||||||
index
|
-0.32
|
0.0003
|
**
|
5.07
|
1.0000
|
|||||||||
Memorandum item: index-ex ^ -0.23
0.0000
** 2.96
0.5838
Notes to
regression: # Sample excludes Gibraltar due to
data availability ^
Additional exclusions: (i)
income per capita in the calculation of the index,
(ii)
outliers (Timor-Leste and Equatorial Guinea).
* Significance at the 5 percent level
** Significance at the 1 percent level
A number of other interesting
findings include that the most statistically significant (P-value) explanatory
variables for growth are the size of the population, the degree of isolation
measured by distance to the nearest continent, and the fertility of land.21 As a result,
the ratio of the Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE) relative to the benchmark model
fitted for the overall average index
is lowest for these three core indicators. Furthermore, the combination of all
indicators into the summary index
yields the best fit. In part, this is because more variation and information is
reflected by the index to explain the
dependent variable, but we would also argue that the combination of
vulnerabilities is important in influencing economic outcomes. It is clearly more
difficult to register consistently good economic performance when exposed to a
significantly larger number of sources for adverse shocks. This relationship is
plotted in Figure 10. As in previous figures, the states in the Asia-Pacific
region are depicted in a darker color.
21 Redding and Venables,
2004, show that the geography of access to markets is statistically significant
and quantitatively important in explaining cross-country differences in per
capita income.
The fitted relationship
indicates the expected negative relationship between the degree of
vulnerability and growth outcomes for small states, but is significantly
affected by two outliers on growth (Timor-Leste, Equatorial Guinea).[20]
One interpretation of the clustering of Pacific states in the top left hand
quadrant of the Figure would be that their relatively high degree of
vulnerability does indeed impede their economic performance by dragging average
growth lower.
As a final illustration, we
refit the equation using a recalculated average ranking index which excludes
income per capita on the basis that its explanatory value was found to be
statistically insignificant, and drop the two outliers from the sample.[21]
The results are shown in Table 4 as index-ex.
Not surprisingly, the fit improves dramatically. The RMSE is significantly
smaller and improves on the aggregate average index of vulnerability by more than 40 percent in explaining
average growth outcomes.[22]
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper cannot assert that
small states in the Pacific are absolutely more vulnerable than small states in
other regions – the scope is simply too narrow to address this question
adequately. It does, however, show that on the limited number of macro-orientated
indicators considered in this study, most small Pacific islands rank as being
particularly exposed to adverse shocks relative to their peers in other
regions. We find that population size, distance from the nearest continent,
arable land, and scope to exploit economies of scale are all statistically
significant in explaining economic outcomes in small states. The combination of
these vulnerabilities into an overall index lends support to the idea that a
confluence of vulnerabilities is also important in determining growth outcomes.
Small island states in the
Pacific are disadvantaged because they are sometimes extremely small in terms
of population and consequently limited in being able to access economies of
scale in the production of goods and services. The quality of soil is often not
very good, and as a result, they can be exposed to the disadvantages that
follow from being heavily dependent on the import of foodstuffs. These are all
relevant considerations that present important challenges for small states in
the region and progress, to varying extent, is being made on overcoming aspects
of these disadvantages.
It is, however, the extreme
degree of isolation of most small states in the Pacific which is quite unique
in defining their vulnerabilities on several facets. While technological
progress has helped to bridge the communication chasm, when it comes to
physical considerations in areas such as trade, commerce, and labor mobility,
significant barriers with economic consequences are not only important but also
unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, as a result of
their geography, small states in the Pacific face a number of environmental
challenges such as tsunamis, hurricanes, and rising sea levels. The tyranny of
the sheer distances involved is therefore likely to remain a key challenge in
the Pacific and will also remain on the forefront of informed policy makers’
minds for some time to come.
Appendix II. Data Sources and Metadata
Arable Land – Sourced from The World Bank, Open Data as at 2010. Available via
Internet:
Arable land includes land defined by the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as land under temporary crops
(double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for
pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow.
Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded.
Environmental Vulnerability
Index, EVI-13, Distance to Closest Continent, Closest Continent – Sourced from
SOPAC and UNEP, 2005.
This indicator captures the proximity of a
country to the nearest continent. Note that if a country is within a continent,
this value is zero. Isolated countries may have a greater risk of loss of
ecosystem types and species during periods of stress if they are far away from
refuges and sources of re-colonization. Isolated countries are also likely to
support fewer species than those which are close to large continents, or
biogeographic centers of radiation. Additionally, there is less chance of
genetic interchange (part of genetic resilience) in isolated areas. The
likelihood of isolation being an important part of a country’s ecological
resilience would be especially important if there are interactions with
on-going human impacts. Countries close to sources of re-colonization are
likely to be less at risk of permanent species losses, compared with those far
away, particularly if they are small or fragmented.
Gross National Income (GNI),
current US dollars – Sourced from The World Bank, Open Data as at 2010. Available via Internet: http://data.worldbank.org/
GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added
by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included
in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of
employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at
official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an
alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge
by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in
international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange
rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This
applies a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year
and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation
between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries
include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Gross National Income (GNI) per
capita, current US dollars – Sourced from The World Bank, Open Data as at 2010. Available via Internet: http://data.worldbank.org/
GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is
the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas
method, divided by the midyear population. (Additional notes see also under
GNI).
Gross National Income (GNI) per
capita, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) – Sourced from The World Bank, Open Data as at 2010. Available via
Internet: http://data.worldbank.org/
GNI per capita based on purchasing power
parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the
same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI
is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes
(less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of
primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.
Data are in current international dollars.
Some values estimated by author using GDP and GDP
per capita data from the CIA World Factbook. Available via Internet:
Population – Sourced from The World Bank, Open Data as at 2010. Available via
Internet:
Total population is based on the de facto
definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status
or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of
asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of
origin. The values shown are midyear estimates.
Regional Classification of States
– Sourced from The World Bank, as at April 2012. Available via Internet:
Geographic classifications and data reported
for geographic regions are for lowincome and middle-income economies only.
Low-income and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing
economies. The use of the term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that
all economies in the group are experiencing similar development or that other
economies have reached a preferred or final stage of development.
Classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status.
Land Area – Sourced from The World Bank, Open Data as at 2010. Available via
Internet:
Land area is a country's total area,
excluding area under inland water bodies,
national claims to continental shelf, and
exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies
includes major rivers and lakes.
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[1] This paper
benefited from helpful comments by Hoseung Lee, Cynthia Rohan, John Rolle,
Piers Merrick, Shanaka Peiris, Dominique Simard, Patrizia Tumbarello, and
Yongzheng Yang. I thank Lucy Pan for discussions about isolation while in
Tuvalu. Data for the Environmental Vulnerability Index was gratefully received
from Ursula Kaly at SOPAC. Significant parts were written while traveling in
Latin America and the Pacific. The title refers to the 1966 book by Geoffrey
Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How
Distance Shaped Australia’s History.
[2] Given the
importance of remittances and transfer payments as sources of income in many of
these countries, GNI is generally accepted as a more appropriate measure than
the value added measured by Gross Domestic Product. See also Appendix I for
metadata.
[3] Fifteen
countries in the raw World Bank database were excluded from the initial sample
of 65 on the basis that comparable data for other variables of interest, mainly
GNI, were not available. This included American Samoa, Aruba, Bermuda, Cayman
Islands, Curacao, Faeroe Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Mayotte, New
Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), St. Martin
(French part), Turks and Caicos Islands, and Virgin Islands (U.S.).
[4] Under the
IDA framework the exceptional circumstances of the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu
are recognized by an exemption for the income per capita threshold that allows
them access to IDA loans. The IMF currently does not make such exemptions for
the PRGT. Refer to IDA (2001), IMF (2009), and IMF (2012).
[5] For a more
detailed discussion of the economic factors that allow countries such as
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein to overcome the disadvantages of their smallness,
see Martins and Winters (2004).
[6] To
investigate this issue more fully, factors such as different fixed costs
arising from characteristics such as dispersion of the population and
accessibility to service providers (e.g. health care) would have to be
considered.
[7] For small
states in the Pacific, the scope for greater integration with Australia and New
Zealand might hold the most promise.
[8] The peak coordinating body
in the region is the Pacific Islands Forum which facilitates the Forum Economic
Ministers Meeting (FEMM). This type
of cooperation has resulted in the formulation of the Pacific Plan, the Pacific
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, several agreements on trade, and
discussion about action on climate change. There is also coordination of
technical assistance and training through the Pacific Financial Technical
Assistance Center (PFTAC). For a concise summary of the Pacific Plan, refer to
Brown (2001).
[9] Refer to
IDA (2001). While income is the main criterion adopted by the World Bank, there
is scope for special considerations and exemptions to this threshold in
exceptional circumstances.
[10] Given that
income thresholds are used as a proxy for welfare, it might also be that in the
presence of significant vulnerabilities and risk aversion, welfare is notably
lower than implied by income per capita.
[11] This is
not surprising given that if the land were very fertile and able to support a
larger number of people, it would probably be more densely populated.
[12] We
acknowledge that while some countries in the Northern Hemisphere may at face
value appear to be quite arable, their proximity to the Arctic Circle severely
curtails the ability to foster a productive agricultural sector.
[13] Many of
the most remote countries, for a variety of reasons, do not export any goods.
As a consequence, container ships that deliver imports in the first leg of the
journey have no rolling stock for the return leg. This raises the cost of
delivering containers. Many smaller island countries also do not have
sufficient infrastructure for the larger, more efficient, container ships to
dock. Furthermore, since fuel is a major part of shipping costs, imports that
require substantial maritime distances to be crossed expose the importing
country even further to the fluctuation in the price of fossil fuels.
[14] Once again
caution is required when making inferences from the data. While the measure of
distance used here is favored because it is simple and transparent, there are
alternative ways to consider isolation. A country may be isolated not because
of distance but because it is landlocked and surrounded by politically unstable
neighbors that are subject to civil unrest. Financial isolation or connectivity
to telecommunications might also be important variables.
[15] On this
measure even relatively heavily populated developed countries can be considered
to be remote from the rest of the world. New Zealand stands out as the single
most distant country from all others in the world based on these calculations.
Ranked at number 15, Australia is also very remote, but in part due to its
size, resource endowments, and colonial ties, has been able to overcome this
disadvantage more effectively than most small states. In the interest of
brevity, these data and the author’s calculations are not shown in this paper
but can be freely obtained from Mayer and Zignago (2011).
[16] There may
also be advantages in dealing with some of the non-linearities in the data by
employing this ranking methodology.
[17] There is
no reason to presume each of the five indicators discussed in this paper are of
equal importance as is implied by the weighting employed. However, the paper
does not presume to estimate the relevant preference function, as this would
differ by region and country.
[18] However,
there are some states in the region that do not appear notably more exposed
than those in other regions.
[19] See also Gallup et al
(1999), and Kuznets (1960).
[20] Both of
these states enjoyed extraordinarily rapid income growth due to significant oil
and gas exploration projects, as well as rising fuel prices during the period
2001 to 2010.
[21] Dropping
the two outliers can also be justified on the grounds that they are almost 4
standard deviations away from the sample mean.
[22] An
informative contrast to the findings presented here and the literature more
generally is Easterly and Kraay (2000), where the authors find no empirical
evidence of such relationships and conclude that small states should receive
the same policy advice as larger countries.
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